Ahmadinejad

In recent years, above all after the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in July 2005, the Islamic Republic of Iran has become a headache for the international community and in particular for the West and even more specifically for the United States and Israel. The aggressive foreign policy adopted by the government led by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, including the hard line about the nuclear issue, transformed Iran into a serious threat for the region.
The countries in the region, the Persian Gulf monarchies in particular, seriously fear the transformation of the Islamic Republic into a regional power. The greatest worry for the countries in that region is the de facto recognition of the Islamic Republic as a regional power by the West and above all by the United States. The nuclear issue, support to the Lebanese Hezbollah, support to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and lastly the increasingly solid presence in Iraq are the trump cards that Ahmadinejad’s Iran can play in its game with the West.
Ahmadinejad holds other cards too: support to the unyielding Shiite Yemenite minority fighting against the central government, the ambiguous support offered to the Afghan Talibans, and the backing given to the Shiite minorities in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait. The web of alliances that the Islamic Republic is weaving in Latin America, led by Ahmadinejad at the very gates to the United States, is not to be underestimated. The front ordered by Ahmadinejad and Chavez is gaining ground and can already count on the support of Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Peru. The speech by the Nicaraguan president, Daniel Ortega, during his recent visit to Teheran, must absolutely not be underestimated. The alliance with the Latin American Marxist and populistic governments opens the way for Ahmadinejad to legitimise the Iranian regime with the European left wing.
Ahmadinejad’s anti-imperialist message is making its way even in certain European left-wing spheres that are strongly linked to some of the Latin American governments. Even though ignored by the international press, the trips to Teheran by left-wing European deputies are more and more frequent. The contribution these trips make in increasing Ahmadinejad’s prestige both in Iran and in other countries in the region is not indifferent. The parades of Italian, French, Spanish and Portuguese deputies before the TV cameras of the Iranian television, which is still the most important information transmission channel, instil Iranian public opinion with the idea of an Iran that is not internationally isolated and has high level political relationships even in the West.
The same message is acknowledged even by part of the Arab public opinion, through the same images transmitted by Al Alam, the Iranian satellite channel that broadcasts 24 hours a day in Arabic. PRESSTV, all news in English by the Iranian state Tv, in a few weeks will start broadcasting 24 hours a day with programmes produced not only in the Teheran studios but also in four studios in Washington, New York, London and Damascus; it will certainly contribute in reinforcing the bonds between the Islamic Republic and the whole pacifist, European left wing area, and the radical Islam in the Southeast Asia countries, considered by the present government a natural basin of religious-political prosetylism for the regime. In Teheran work is already being done also on an all-news channel in Castilian, destined to repeat the success of Al Alam in Central and South America.
The impotence of the opposition abroad, which has no inside reference point, and the difficult work conditions for the inside opponents who suffer from political schizophrenia are another element in favour of the regime. However, on the internal front, the regime has to reckon with a strong division inside the power structure, the most critical since the birth of the Islamic Republic.
A disastrous economic situation moves the society towards a bipolarisation that is sweeping away the middle class and condemning the poor to become poorer. The gap between laymen and the clergy grows and gets deeper with the constant increase of the former and the decrease of the latter. In these conditions, any attempt at change becomes a wager with uncertain outcome. One uncertainty offers a wide range of possibilities: from an obscurantist authoritarian swing to a sudden collapse.
By Ahmad Rafat

Sommario

Introductory remarks
ANALYSIS
The power structure after Ahmadinejad
Power and vulnerabilities of Ahmadinejad
Ethnic minorities
Young people, women and workers
Political opposition
RESOURCES
“WHAT IRANIANS THINK”, AN EXCLUSIVE OPINION SURVEY
_ The research
_ “What Iranians think”
_ The poll
THE POWER STRUCTURE ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION
_ Supreme leader (vali faghih)
_ President of the Republic
_ Parliament (majlis)
_ Assembly of Experts (majlis khobreghan)
_ Council of Guardians (shoraye negahban)
_ Expediency Council (majlis tashkhis maslehat nezam)
_ Judiciary (ghovveh ghazaiyeh)
_ Supreme National Security Council (shoraye ali amniat melli)
_ Regular Army
_ Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (sepah pasdaran enghelab eslami)
_ Ministry of Intelligence & Security (vezarat ettela’at va amniat)